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Performance Evaluations Are Not Legitimacy 
Judgments: 
A Caution About Interpreting Public Opinions Toward 
the United States Supreme Court* 
James L. Gibson** 
ABSTRACT 
It is commonplace for the mass media to report that the U.S. 
Supreme Court is losing the support of the American people. Such 
reports often rely on citizens’ performance evaluations: judgments of 
how well the Court is doing its job. Not only is dissatisfaction 
widespread and seemingly growing, but it also seems to be 
characterized by partisan and ideological polarization. But, as 
scholars have long taught, performance evaluations are not the same 
thing as institutional legitimacy. Indeed, the point and value of 
legitimacy is that constituents will stand by a legitimate institution 
even when it is performing poorly—a concept often described as a 
“reservoir of goodwill.” In this Article, I explicate the conceptual and 
empirical differences between performance and legitimacy, based on 
a May 2016 nationally representative survey of the American people. 
I find, with others, that performance evaluations are grounded to 
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some degree in partisan differences, but to a greater degree in 
ideological differences. The institutional legitimacy of the Supreme 
Court, however, does not at all reflect partisan polarization, and to 
only the slightest degree does it reflect ideological polarization. 
These data describe public attitudes at only a single point-in-time. As 
the Court enters into a dramatically more politicized context, only 
time will tell whether its institutional legitimacy can survive. 
Perhaps the most salient aspect of contemporary American 
politics is its degree of polarization.1 Anyone who has been even 
remotely near a television set during the last year of the U.S. 
presidential election will require no proof whatsoever of this 
empirical claim. 
At first glance, it seems that the federal judiciary is being sucked 
into the vortex of polarized views. Although perhaps not the most 
salient issue in the 2016 presidential election, the future of the 
Supreme Court was certainly not ignored by either candidate—or the 
electorate. And, as I write this, it is clear to even the most casual 
observer of American judicial politics that the politics of confirming 
Supreme Court nominees under the Trump presidency are quiet likely 
to remain toxic. 
Moreover, reports on public opinion seem to indicate that 
public attitudes toward the Court have themselves become 
polarized. For example, a 2015 Pew Report announced 
“Negative Views of Supreme Court at Record High, Driven by 
Republican Dissatisfaction.”2 According to Pew, it appears that 
a large proportion of the American people are dissatisfied with 
their Supreme Court, and that levels of dissatisfaction reflect 
 
 1  The literature on polarization is vast. See, e.g., Shanto Iyengar, E Pluribus Pluribus, 
or Divided We Stand, 80 Pub. Op. Q. 219 (2016). 
2 Negative Views of Supreme Court at Record High, Driven by Republican 
Dissatisfaction: 68% of Conservative Republicans See Court as Liberal, Pew Res. Ctr. (July 29, 
2015), http://www.people-press.org/2015/07/29/negative-views-of-supreme-court-at-record-
high-driven-by-republican-dissatisfaction/2/.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/11
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partisan differences. 
Scholarly research, however, is not so certain polarization is 
taking place. For instance, in 2007 I concluded (from an 
analysis of 2005 public opinion data) that the legitimacy of the 
Supreme Court in the eyes of the American people was not 
closely related to ideological or partisan self-identifications.3 
The crux of the polarization debate turns on what specific 
attitudes toward the Court are being measured. For decades 
now, following Easton’s seminal work, I have distinguished 
between what is termed “diffuse support” and “specific 
support.”4 To simplify matters, I refer to these two concepts as 
“institutional legitimacy” (or “institutional support”) and 
“performance evaluations.” Performance evaluations are 
exactly that: evaluations of how well the Supreme Court is 
doing its job. Institutional legitimacy is a bit more 
complicated.5 Professor Tyler provides a useful definition of 
the concept:6 
Legitimacy is a psychological property of an authority, 
institution, or social arrangement that leads those connected to 
 
3 James L. Gibson, The Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court in a Polarized Polity, 4 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 507, 507 (2007).  
 4  DAVID EASTON, A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL LIFE 249 (1965). 
 5  For a review, see James L. Gibson & Michael J. Nelson, The Legitimacy of the U.S. 
Supreme Court: Conventional Wisdoms and Recent Challenges Thereto, 10 ANN. REV. L. & 
SOC. SCI. 201 (2014). 
 6  Just to be as clear as possible, the legitimacy I am addressing is what is sometimes 
termed “sociological legitimacy,” for example, Michael L. Wells, “Sociological Legitimacy” in 
Supreme Court Opinions, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1011 (2007), which is an empirical concept, 
not a normative one. For a consideration of whether the U.S. Supreme Court can have too much 
legitimacy, see James L. Gibson & Michael J. Nelson, Can the U.S. Supreme Court Have Too 
Much Legitimacy?, MAKING LAW AND COURTS RESEARCH RELEVANT: THE NORMATIVE 
IMPLICATIONS OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 169 (Brandon L. Bartels & Chris W. Bonneau eds., 
2015).  
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it to believe that it is appropriate, proper, and just. Because of 
legitimacy, people feel that they ought to defer to decisions 
and rules, following them voluntarily out of obligation rather 
than out of fear of punishment or anticipation of reward. Being 
legitimate is important to the success of authorities, 
institutions, and institutional arrangements since it is difficult 
to exert influence over others based solely upon the possession 
and use of power. Being able to gain voluntary acquiescence 
from most people, most of the time, due to their sense of 
obligation increases effectiveness during periods of scarcity, 
crisis, and conflict.7 
Although it is true that institutional legitimacy is to some degree 
dependent on the institution’s performance evaluations, I make both a 
conceptually and empirically distinction between the two.8 Indeed, 
were they not, then legitimacy would be of little value to an 
institution. As I have previously noted, “legitimacy is for losers,” by 
which I mean that legitimacy is a mechanism by which losers in 
policy fights can come to accept their loss.9 
The purpose of this Article is to investigate contemporary 
attitudes toward the Supreme Court based on data from a survey 
conducted in May 2016 with a representative sample of the American 
 
 7  Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 ANN. 
REV. PSYCHOL. 375, 375 (2006). 
 8  A debate rages in the political science literature over exactly how dependent 
legitimacy is upon satisfactory performance evaluations. See e.g., Brandon L. Bartels & 
Christopher D. Johnston, On the Ideological Foundations of Supreme Court Legitimacy in the 
American Public, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 184, 184 (2013); James L. Gibson & Michael J. Nelson, 
Is the U.S. Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Grounded in Performance Satisfaction and Ideology?, 
59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 162, 162 (2015); Dino P. Christenson & David M. Glick, Chief Justice 
Robert’s Health Care Decision Disrobed: The Microfoundations of the Supreme Court’s 
Legitimacy, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 403 (2015).  
 9  James L. Gibson, Legitimacy is for Losers: The Interconnections of Institutional 
Legitimacy, Performance Evaluations, and the Symbols of Judicial Authortity, in MOTIVATING 
COOPERATION AND COMPLIANCE WITH AUTHORITY: THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL TRUST 81, 
83 (Brian H. Bornstein & Alan J. Tomkins eds., 2015).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/11
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people.10 In particular, I am concerned with the degree to which 
Supreme Court attitudes are polarized by partisanship and ideology. 
In this investigation, I make a very important distinction between 
institutional legitimacy and performance evaluations, and argue that 
it is crucial that we do not take performance evaluations to be 
indicators of institutional support. Performance evaluations are 
indeed connected to ideological self-identifications, and less so to 
partisanship, but the Court’s institutional legitimacy shows no signs 
of partisan polarization, and only the weakest signs of ideological 
polarization.  
MEASURING SUPREME COURT ATTITUDES 
Measuring performance evaluations is quite straightforward. In 
the May 2016 TAPS survey, respondents were asked: “Do you 
approve or disapprove of the way the following are doing their jobs?” 
The “U.S. Supreme Court” was on the list, with available responses 
ranging from “strongly approve” to “strongly disapprove.”  
 Because institutional legitimacy is a more abstract concept, 
we typically use multiple indicators to measure it.11 In the TAPS 
survey, the respondents were asked to indicate their degree of 
agreement or disagreement with the following propositions: 
•  If the U.S. Supreme Court started making a lot of decisions that 
most disagree with, it might be better to do away with the Court 
altogether. 
 
 10  This paper relies on a survey I commissioned on The American Panel Study (TAPS), 
a monthly online survey. TAPS panelists were first recruited as a national probability sample in 
the fall of 2011 by Knowledge Networks for the Weidenbaum Center at Washington 
University. Individuals without internet access were provided a laptop and internet service at 
the expense of the Weidenbaum Center. See generally The American Panel Survey (TAPS), 
WASH. UNIV. ST. LOUIS, http://taps.wustl.edu (last visited Feb. 24, 2017) (explaining more 
technical information about the survey). The data for this study come primarily from the TAPS 
survey of May 2016. 
 11  For a discussion of measuring institutional support, see James L. Gibson et al., 
Measuring Attitudes Toward the United States Supreme Court, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 354 (2003).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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•  The right of the Supreme Court to decide certain types of 
controversial issues should be reduced. 
•  The U.S. Supreme Court gets too mixed up in politics. 
•  Justices on the Court who consistently make decisions at odds 
with what the majority want should be removed from their position. 
•  The Court ought to be made less independent so that it listens a 
lot more to what the people want. 
•  It is inevitable that the Court gets mixed up in politics; we 
ought to have stronger means of controlling the Court. 
•  Justices are just like other politicians; we cannot trust them to 
decide cases in the best interests of our country. 
 
Figure 1. Attitudes Toward the Supreme Court, 2016 
 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/11
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Note:  
“Low” support is the percentage of respondents expressing 
opposition to the Supreme Court on the seven diffuse items, 
with “don’t know” or “uncertain” responses treated as 
supportive. For specific support (performance evaluations), the 
percentage reported pertains to those who “strongly” or 
“somewhat” disapprove of the way the Court is doing its job. 
Source: TAPS 2016, supra note 10. 
Figure 1 reports the sample’s replies to both the performance 
evaluations and institutional support (all seven measures) questions. 
Specifically, it shows the percentage of respondents expressing low 
support for the Court. The performance question is the second from 
the right, and it indicates that 47% of the respondents tell us that the 
Supreme Court is not doing its job very well. It is just this sort of 
finding that lead many to believe that the Supreme Court has a 
tenuous and potentially rocky relationship with its constituents. 
Nearly all the measures of institutional support report dramatically 
smaller figures for the proportions not supporting the Court. For 
instance, only 15% agree that the Court ought to be done away with if 
it continually makes decisions with which most people disagree. The 
single exception to this tendency is for the item stating that the 
“Court gets too mixed up in politics”: 52% of the respondents agree 
with that statement. This most likely reflects at least in part the 
political activities of the justices,12 and other instances in which the 
Court, by its actions or the actions of others, does indeed get too 
mixed up in politics. On most of the measures of institutional 
support, the data show that opposition to the legitimacy of the Court 
 
 12  See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, No Fan of Donald Trump, Critiques 
Latest Term, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/11/us/politics/ruth-bader-ginsburg-no-fan-of-donald-trump-
critiques-latest-term.html (explaining Justice Ginsburg’s criticism of then-presidential candidate 
Donald Trump). 
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is small and is about one-half of the figure for those thinking the 
Court is doing a poor job. 
A considerable body of literature has emerged investigating the 
connection between performance evaluations and institutional 
support.13 From the point-of-view of legitimacy theory, there must be 
a difference; the whole point of legitimacy is that it provides a 
“reservoir of goodwill”14 that the institution can draw upon when its 
constituents are dissatisfied with its decisions and other aspects of its 
performance.  
In one of the few multi-nation studies of public attitudes toward 
national high courts, Gibson, Caldeira, and Baird reported 
correlations of diffuse and specific support that, according to my 
arithmetic, average to 0.33.15 Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 
discovered that the legitimacy of the Supreme Court was not affected 
by its ruling in Bush v. Gore,16 even among the losers in that case 
(e.g., Democrats and blacks).17 Of course, legitimacy should not be 
entirely independent of performance evaluations, but danger lurks 
when performance and legitimacy converge too much. 
In the TAPS data, some relationship does indeed exist between the 
two constructs. On average, about 3.3 of the 7 diffuse support 
statements were endorsed by the respondents. (This figure counts 
those who replied with “don’t know” or “uncertain” responses as 
non-supportive replies.) Using the criterion of endorsing at least 4 of 
the 7 measures, Figure 2 reports the relationship between 
performance evaluations and diffuse support.  
 
 13  See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 14  Easton, supra note 4 at 249.  
 15  James L. Gibson et al., On the Legitimacy of National High Courts, 92 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 343, 352 (1998). 
 16  Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).  
 17  James L. Gibson et al., The Supreme Court and the US Presidential Election of 2000: 
Wounds, Self-Inflicted or Otherwise?, 33 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 535, 543 (2003). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/11
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Figure 2. The Relationship Between Specific and Diffuse 
Support for the Supreme Court, 2016 
 
 
Note: 
 N = 1,265 
 Difference of means test: p < .000 
 Bivariate correlation: r = .39 
  
 Source: TAPS 2016, supra note 10. 
 
The data in Figure 2 support two major conclusions. First, a 
considerable relationship exists between the two variables: those who 
think the Court is doing its job well also tend to extend legitimacy to 
the institution. Second, however, the relationship is far from perfect: 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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those who disapprove of the performance of the Supreme Court still 
express relatively high levels of institutional support. This is clearest 
among those respondents somewhat disapproving of how well the 
Court is doing its job. Nearly four out of ten Americans (39%) 
nonetheless express higher than average support for the institution. 
Even one-fourth (25%) of those strongly disapproving of the Court’s 
job performance still proclaim considerable support for the 
institution. Specific and diffuse support for the Court are clearly 
related, but among those disapproving of the Court’s performance, a 
substantial reservoir of goodwill seems to exist. 
PARTISAN AND IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION OF SUPREME COURT 
ATTITUDES 
The basic polarization hypothesis is that attitudes toward the 
Supreme Court can be predicted from one’s partisan and/or 
ideological identifications. Testing the hypothesis is fairly 
straightforward. Figure 3 reports the basic relationship between 
institutional support and partisan identifications; Figure 4 reports the 
relationship using ideological self-identification as the independent 
variable. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/11
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Figure 3A. The Relationship Between Partisan Identifications 
and Supreme Court Institutional Support 
 
Note: 
 N = 969 
 Difference of means test: p = .002 
 Bivariate correlation: r = -.04 
 
Source: TAPS 2016, supra note 10. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Figure 3B. The Relationship Between Partisan Identifications 
and Evaluations of the Performance of the Supreme Court 
 
Note: 
 N = 768 
 Difference of means test: p < .000 
 Bivariate correlation: r = -.27 
 
Source: TAPS 2016, supra note 10. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/11
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Figure 4A. The Relationship Between Ideological 
Identifications and Supreme Court Institutional Support 
 
Note: 
 N = 1,516 
 Difference of means test: p = .000 
 Bivariate correlation: r = -.14 
 
Source: TAPS 2016, supra note 10. 
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Figure 4B. The Relationship Between Ideological 
Identifications and Evaluations of the Performance of the 
Supreme Court 
 
Note: 
 N = 1,213 
 Difference of means test: p < .000 
 Bivariate correlation: r = -.37 
  
Source: TAPS 2016, supra note 10. 
 
Although the relationship between partisan identifications and 
institutional legitimacy is statistically distinguishable from zero (p = 
.002—see Figure 3A), the degree of correlation is entirely trivial (r = 
-.04). This can easily be seen by comparing strong Democrats, who 
on average support 3.5 of the legitimacy statements, and strong 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/11
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Republicans, who support 3.2 of the statements. The proper 
conclusion from Figure 3A is that Supreme Court legitimacy is not 
polarized by the partisanship of its constituents. 
Contrast this lack of relationship with that shown in the second 
part of Figure 3, which depicts the connection between partisan 
identifications and performance evaluations. Here, the correlation is 
more substantial (r = -.27). To see the strength of this relationship, 
compare the attitudes of strong Democrats and strong Republicans: 
34% of the former disapprove of the performance of Court; for the 
latter, the figure balloons to 67%. The general conclusion this figure 
supports is that partisan polarization characterizes public views of the 
contemporary performance of the Supreme Court, but it does not 
characterize the public’s willingness to extend legitimacy to the 
institution of the Court.  
A slightly stronger relationship is depicted in Figure 4A; 
ideological self-identification is a significantly better predictor of 
institutional support than is partisanship. Here, the relationship is -
.14, which is not very strong, but is certainly stronger than the 
correlation between partisanship and legitimacy. Those who are very 
liberal extend more legitimacy to the Court than those who are very 
conservative, to be sure, but across all of the categories of liberalism 
and conservatism, the differences in attitudes toward the Court are 
relatively small. 
That is not true of the relationship between ideological 
identification and performance evaluations. These two attitudes are 
more strongly connected than any in the analysis reported here: r = -
.37. Indeed, it is impressive to see just how disgruntled very 
conservative people are with the Supreme Court: 82% judge the 
Court to not be performing its job very well. This contrasts with only 
38% of those identifying as very liberal giving low marks to the 
Court.  
Three conclusions arrive from Figure 4. First, some slight 
evidence of ideological polarization exists in Supreme Court 
legitimacy. Second, that polarization pales in comparison to the 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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polarization on performance evaluations. Third, to the extent that 
there is polarization in Court attitudes, it occurs along ideological, not 
partisan, lines. 
Confidence in this last conclusion actually requires one more 
analytical step. Because partisan and ideological identification are 
inter-correlated, multivariate statistical analysis is required. Because I 
am interested in the total effect of these variables, rather than the 
effect that is independent of all other possible control variables, I do 
not require a fully specified model of the two dependent variables. 
Table 1 reports the results of the statistical analysis. 
 
Table 1. Ideology and Partisan Predictors of Supreme Court 
Attitudes 
 
Notes: 
 All variables in this analysis range from 0 through 1. 
 “Coefficients” are unstandardized regression coefficients  
  from an OLS analysis. 
  N = 749 
 
Source: TAPS 2016, supra note 10. 
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The analysis in this table first confirms that partisanship and 
ideology are far better predictors of performance evaluations than of 
institutional support (as revealed by the R2 statistic). Second, 
partisanship has absolutely nothing to do with institutional support. 
Third, ideological self-identification is connected to institutional 
support, but weakly, and certainly in contrast to the relationship 
between ideology and performance evaluations (-.12 versus -.27). 
Finally, performance evaluations are considerably more closely 
connected to ideology than to partisanship. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
The most certain conclusion to draw from this analysis is that 
partisan polarization does not characterize popular attitudes toward 
the Supreme Court as an institution. If one wants a sign of 
polarization, one should turn to ideology, not partisanship. But even 
here, only evidence of the weakest ideological polarization has been 
adduced in this Article. When it comes to the institution itself, 
Americans of all stripes broadly support the Supreme Court. 
The same cannot be said for performance evaluations. Big chunks 
of the American populace are not happy with their Supreme Court. 
To a slight degree, this reflects partisan differences; to a much 
stronger degree, this reflects ideological differences. Strong 
conservatives in particular are quite disgruntled with the performance 
of the Supreme Court.  
One obvious criticism of the empirical evidence adduced in this 
study is that it is static: it represents a snapshot of public opinion at 
only a single point in time. In the longer term, one could spin a story 
from these data that spells danger and peril for the Court. At the 
present, evaluations of the Court are connected to ideology; as 
partisan sorting in all phases of American politics takes place, it may 
not take much time for ideological differences to bleed into partisan 
differences. More important, performance evaluations today, which 
are indeed grounded in ideological differences, may ultimately 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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contaminate attitudes toward the institution itself. No theory of 
legitimacy suggests that a badly performing institution can maintain 
its institutional support ad infinitum.  
Adding fuel to this argument is that, although the Court today 
appears to some scholars to be moderate in its policy making,18 it is 
quite likely, given the Trump presidency, to become more 
ideologically extreme in the near future, which can, it seems, erode 
the institution’s basic support. How long this might take, no social 
scientist can say. That there may be danger for the Court in the near 
future, however, seems reasonably likely.  
Finally, I return to the basic caution that motivates this paper. 
Performance evaluations are not the same thing as institutional 
legitimacy, and should not be understood as such. Despite growing 
disapproval of how the Court is doing its job, institutional support 
shows few signs of erosion. Not no signs, but few signs. Its reservoir 
of goodwill is, at present, intact. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 18  Bartels & Johnston, supra note 8 at 196. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/11
